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tices Act": Combating North Carolina Businesses Who Undercut
Competition by Hiring Illegal Immigrants
I. INTRODUCTION
The hiring of illegal immigrants is an increasing problem that is
pandemic throughout the United States, particularly in North Caro-
lina. According to the Center for Immigration Studies, North Caro-
lina's immigrant population (both legal and illegal) increased threefold
between 1995 and 2005 (170,000 to 590,000).1 Growth during the
past five years has been even more rapid.2 North Carolina's immigrant
population has increased by 58.1% between 2000 and 2005 (373,000
to 590,000), 3 and the state has the nation's eighth-largest population
of illegal aliens.4
The problem faced by many business owners in North Carolina is
that many businesses knowingly hire illegal immigrants at lower wages
and with the intent to avoid taxes. This lowers labor costs, providing
these businesses a competitive, albeit illegal, edge. Consequently, bus-
iness owners that follow the law are put at a severe competitive disad-
vantage. Numerous businesses in North Carolina hire illegal
immigrants. The Raleigh, North Carolina News & Observer noted in a
February 2007 article that over 500 employees at a Smithfield Packing
Company plant in Bladen County-nearly 10 percent of the total work
force-were slated for termination for failing to provide adequate
employment documentation.5
The legal issue explored in this Comment is whether a cause of
action is available to North Carolina business owners that have been
put at an economic disadvantage by competing companies that hire
illegal immigrants. A unique approach has been developed in
Anaheim, California, by attorney David Klehm who has initiated a suit
1. Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of America's Foreign-
Born Population in 2005, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, Dec. 2005, http://www.cis.
org/articles/2005/backl4O5.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. JEFFERY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION (2005), http://pewhispanic.org/
files/reports/44.pdf.
5. Kristin Collins, Screening Flags Illegal Workers at N.C. Sites, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh), Feb. 5, 2007, at Al.
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on behalf of a business that alleged it was put in a detrimental position
by a competitor who used illegal workers.6 Klehm's strategy is to use
antitrust laws, which prohibit companies from conspiring to prevent
competition, in suits against employers who hire illegal immigrants.
7
In August 2006, Klehm filed a suit on behalf of Global Horizons,
Inc. against Munger Brothers, LLC for alleged violations of California's
antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act.8 In Global Horizons, Inc. v. Mun-
ger Brothers, LLC, AgriLabor, a division of Los Angeles-based Global
Horizons, had a contract to provide farm workers to help Munger
Brothers pick blueberries over a nine-week harvest from April to June.9
AgriLabor was expected to provide 600 workers to Munger Broth-
ers, LLC during the peak of the picking season. 10 According to the
suit, Munger Brothers, LLC ended its contract with AgriLabor in the
middle of May, at the start of the peak harvest, arguing that the work-
ers provided failed to pick berries quickly enough." After terminating
its contract with AgriLabor, Munger contracted to obtain farm workers
from two local companies that hire illegal immigrants.' 2 AgriLabor,
following federal laws, obtained temporary visas and provided housing
for its workers from Thailand and Central America which added costs
to labor. The suit alleges that the other labor providers didn't meet
such requirements, enabling them to offer Munger a cheaper deal due
to lowered costs of hiring illegal immigrants.
13
II. OVERVIEW
Utilizing North Carolina antitrust statutes to combat companies
who gain an unfair or illegal competitive edge appears to be a novel
approach. As in California prior to the Global Horizons suit, as of this
writing, not one case has been raised in a North Carolina court alleg-
ing such a claim. The objective of this Comment is to provide an over-
view of legal remedies that North Carolina businesses can utilize to
combat businesses that have obtained a competitive edge by hiring ille-
gal immigrants.
6. Amy Taxin, Suit contends illegal pickers undercut firm, THE ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER (Orange County), Aug. 5, 2006. http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/
homepage/abox/article 1250390.php
7. Id.
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720-16728 (Deering 2007).
9. Global Horizons, Inc. v. Munger Brothers, LLC, 2006 CA Sup. Ct. Pleadings
LEXIS 923 (2006).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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The scope of this Comment is limited to remedies available under
North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act' 4 and com-
mon law torts actions available under North Carolina law that fall
under section 75. Section III of this comment provides a brief over-
view of North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. It
is important to note that there are two prongs under section 75-1.1,
"unfair methods" and "unfair or deceptive acts and practices." 15 Due
to the expansive and confusing nature of section 75-1.1, the scope of
analysis offered in the next section is limited to solely the "unfair or
deceptive acts and practices" prong. Section IV reviews cases that par-
allel the factors in Klehm's Global Horizons Inc. case and offers a
framework of analysis based upon the "unfair or deceptive acts and
practices" prong of section 75-1.1. Section V addresses two North Car-
olina torts: tortious interference with prospective economic advantage
and tortious interference with contracts, both of which are frequently
raised under a section 75-1.1 claim. This section also discusses the
benefits of raising a tort claim under section 75-1.1. Finally, section VI
concludes and briefly mentions other sections of North Carolina anti-
trust law that may offer business owners additional causes of action.
1II. NORTH CAROLINA'S UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices statute,16
offers an expansive litigation tool that is relied upon significantly by
claimants in commercial litigation. 17 In North Carolina, "[u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlaw-
ful."' 8 For those familiar with federal antitrust statutes, N.C. Gen. Stat.
75-1.1 is an exact copy of language in the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA).19
As a preliminary matter, it is important to dissect the act into two
prongs: "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts
and practices. '20 In the federal context, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the reviewing federal courts apply the "unfair methods" of
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (2005).
15. John F. Graybeal, Unfair Trade Practices, Antitrust and Consumer Welfare in
North Carolina, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1927, 1929 (2002).
16. § 75-1.1.
17. Graybeal, supra note 15, at 1929.
18. § 75-1.1(a).
19. 15 U.S.C.S § 45(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2007).
20. Graybeal, supra note 15, at 1929.
335
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competition under the FTCA to antitrust conduct."' The "unfair or
deceptive acts and practices" prong applies to issues not raising anti-
22trust concerns. The main difference between both prongs is that an
unfair method of competition requires a showing of an adverse effect
on market competition while the unfair or deceptive act and practices
prong does not require a showing of any effect on market competi-
tion. 23 Furthermore, when applying N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-1.1, North Car-
olina courts have issued confusing opinions by misapplying the
prongs, sometimes not requiring an effect on competition under an
unfair method of competition fact pattern and vice versa. 24 This con-
fusion is discussed in detail by Professor Graybeal in an article enti-
tled, Unfair Trade Practices, Antitrust and Consumer Welfare in North
Carolina.25 A detailed discussion of these issues goes beyond the
scope of this paper. It is prudent to mention the differences between
the prongs and to mention the confusion, because research of North
Carolina case law falling under N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-1.1 shows that
North Carolina courts frequently misapply the law.
To alleviate the inherent confusion of the interpretation of the Act,
this paper focuses exclusively on the "unfair or deceptive act or prac-
tice" prong. The objective of this narrow focus is to reduce uncertainty
regarding the conflicting opinions rendered by North Carolina courts
and to focus on the prong that offers fewest burdens for a plaintiffs
attorney. The unfair or deceptive prong does not require a showing of
any effect on market competition. This is not to say that additional
remedies are not available under the first prong or under other provi-
sions of Chapter 75. Other remedies may be available, but these areas
go beyond the narrow scope of this paper.
Section 75-1.1 is a unique section in the North Carolina code.
Unlike the federal antitrust statutes, it encompasses a broader sector of
business activity. Section 75-1.1 permits business torts to be raised as
unfair and deceptive acts. 26 Additionally, unlike the FTCA, which pre-
cludes a private cause of action, the North Carolina unfair trade prac-
tices statute affords a private cause of action. Furthermore, the
benefits to injured parties and attorneys are more evident in the North
Carolina code. A winning plaintiff in a section 75-1.1 case automati-
21. Id at 1931.
22. Id. at 1939.
23. Id. at 1939, 1970.
24. See generally id.
25. Id.; see also American Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 640 F.
Supp. 1411, 1434 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
26. Graybeal, supra note 15, at 1955.
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cally receives treble damages.27 Furthermore, the plaintiff's "duly
licensed attorney" may get attorney's fees at the discretion of the
court.
2 8
A. Elements for a Cause of Action
At first glance, the elements for a claim under section 75-1.1 may
seem straightforward. The elements of a claim for unfair and deceptive
practices are: (1) an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in or affect-
ing commerce, (3) which proximately causes actual injury to the plain-
tiff or to his business. 29 The inherent beauty, for the plaintiff of
course, is that the aforementioned elements offer a very broad avenue
of approach for litigation. The statute is so broad it has led to a signifi-
cant amount of criticism by authorities. 30 Regardless of the criticism,
the second prong of section 75-1.1 offers a crystal clear path of analy-
sis for fact patterns similar to Global Horizons, Inc.
B. Unfair or Deceptive Act or Practice
The greatest amount of flexibility for the plaintiffs' bar in initiat-
ing a claim comes from the first element that requires the defendant to
commit an "unfair or deceptive act or practice." In general, the courts
use a mix of North Carolina common law and federal statutes to define
"unfair" and "deceptive" which results in a broad definition that encap-
sulates a wide variety of acts and practices.3 1
Section 75-1.1 does not define the term "deceptive."32 Accord-
ingly, the North Carolina courts have borrowed the expansive defini-
tion of "deception" that federal courts have traditionally employed in
interpreting the FTCA.33 The North Carolina Supreme Court, summa-
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2005); see also Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty,
338 S.E.2d 918 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Peterson v. Bozzano, 183 B.R. 735 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 1995).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16.1. This is different from federal antitrust actions where
attorney's fees are awarded to successful plaintiffs themselves. See 15 U.S.C. §15(a)
(LexisNexis 2007).
29. Furr v. Fonville Morisey Realty, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); see
also Peterson, 183 B.R. 735; Wysong & Miles Co. v. Employers of Wausau, 4 F. Supp.
2d 421 (M.D.N.C. 1998); First Atl. Mgt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 507 S.E.2d 56
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
30. See generally, Graybeal, supra note 15.
31. Id. at 1934.
32. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1.
33. Hageman v. Twin City Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 303 (M.D.N.C.
1988).
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rizing the essence of "deception" in Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins.
Co., stated,
Though the factors which the Federal Trade Commission considers in
making a determination of whether a practice is unfair are of necessity
broad, the application they received by the Seventh Circuit in Spiegel
reveals their essence: A party is guilty of an unfair act or practice when
it engages in conduct which amounts to an inequitable assertion of its
power or position."
34
Additionally, "a practice is unfair if it is unethical or unscrupulous,
and it is deceptive if it has a tendency to deceive. 35
Although the acts and practices that can fall under the first ele-
ment are very broad, North Carolina courts have found limitations that
restrict the wide range of practices and acts that could possibly fall
under the Act. For example, a mere breach of contract does not consti-
tute an unfair or deceptive trade practice. 36 A requirement of aggravat-
ing circumstances is required in addition to a claim of breach of
contract.37 In Johnson v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co., a case
arising from the termination of an employee where the jury found
there was a breach of contract by the employer and also found the
employer engaged in two of three aggravating circumstances associ-
ated with the breach, the employer had engaged in unfair and deceptive
trade practices. 38 The court in Johnson recognized that failure to inves-
tigate a false claim and use of a false claim as an allegation that
resulted in termination of employment are aggravating factors that
transformed a breach of contract claim into an unfair or deceptive
trade practice.39
Additionally, a violation of North Carolina public policy can be an
unfair and deceptive trade practice. 40 A practice is generally unfair
when it "offends established public policy as well as when the practice
is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially inju-
34. 266 S.E.2d 610, 622 (N.C. 1980), overruled by Meyers & Chapman, Inc. v.
Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 385 (N.C. 1988). Meyers overruled Johnson, but
only in respect to the element of "intent" in a cause of action for fraud. Johnson is still
valid authority for the purposes of this discussion.
35. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987).
36. Horack v. S. Real Estate Co. of Charlotte, 563 S.E.2d 47, 51 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002).
37. Baldine v. Furniture Comfort Corp. 956 F. Supp. 580, 587 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
38. Johnson v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 618 S.E.2d 867, 869-70 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005).
39. Id. at 71.
40. Process Components, Inc. v. Baltimore Aircoil Co., 366 S.E.2d 907 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1998), affid, 374 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. 1988).
338 [Vol. 29:333
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rious .... ",41 The use of public policy to constitute an unfair or decep-
tive act or practice offers a plethora of opportunities to satisfy the
initial requirements of section 75-1.1. North Carolina courts have rec-
ognized that a violation of a North Carolina General Statute may be a
violation of public policy.42 For example, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., addressing a violation of the
North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, held, "Without question, payment
of the minimum wage is the public policy of North Carolina."43 Con-
sequently, an employer's failure to pay an employee the minimum wage
easily satisfies the requirement of an unfair or deceptive act.
An unanswered question is whether a violation of a federal stat-
ute, or federal public policy, would also be a violation of North Caro-
lina public policy. For example, would the violation of a federal
immigration statute be, absent a North Carolina statute prohibiting the
hiring of illegal immigrants, a violation of North Carolina public pol-
icy? The federal Immigration and Nationality Act considers felonious
the acts of transporting, assisting, sheltering, or assisting an alien rea-
sonably known to be illegally in the United States or lacking employ-
ment authorization.44 Additionally, it is a crime to assist an illegal
alien who lacks employment authorization by referring him to an
employer or by acting as his employer.45 A good faith argument could
be made that a violation of federal law is also a violation of North
Carolina public policy. Furthermore, the violation of a federal statute
could be considered "unethical" thus satisfying the unfair requirement
of section 75-1.1.
C. In or Affecting Commerce
"In or affecting commerce" is the second element of a claim for
unfair and deceptive practices and encompasses a broad area of busi-
ness activity. Section 75-1.1 states, "For purposes of this section, 'com-
merce' includes all business activities, however denominated, but does
not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned
profession. ' 46 The North Carolina Supreme Court, citing United
Supreme Court decisions, stated in Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life
41. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 266 S.E.2d 610, 621 (N.C. 1980).
42. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 403 S.E.2d 565, 567 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(citing N.C. GEN. STAT § 95-25.1(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 416 S.E.2d 166 (N.C.
1992).
43. Id.
44. INA §274A(a)(1)(A) (2007); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324(a)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2007).
45. Id.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (2005).
7
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Insurance Co., "[c]ommerce in its broadest sense comprehends inter-
course for the purposes of trade in any form."'4 7 Furthermore, the N.C.
Supreme Court addressed limitations on "commerce" by recognizing
in Johnson the use of the word "trade" interchangeably with the word
"commerce" indicates that the statute intends a narrower definition of
commerce, which contemplates an exchange of some type.48
In addition to the exchange limitation, the statute itself exempts
both "professional services rendered by a member of a learned profes-
sion '49 and acts committed by advertisers who are unaware of their
"false, misleading or deceptive character."5 Furthermore, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals has created further exemptions. In two
cases, Rosenthal v. Perkins and Robertson v. Boyd, the court held that
private homeowners selling a residence are not subject to the Act.51 In
Rosenthal, the court stated,
The defendants ... were not engaged in trade or commerce. They did
not by the sale of their residence on this one occasion become realtors.
It is clear from the cases involving violation of the Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act that the alleged violators must be engaged in a business, a
commercial or industrial establishment or enterprise:
52
The requirement of an exchange in Johnson, accompanied with the
Rosenthal requirement that violators must be engaged in a business,
commercial or industrial establishment or enterprise still encompasses
virtually all businesses that have not been specifically excluded under
the act, such as professional services of a learned profession or adver-
tising. It is safe to say any person, acting individually and outside of
the bounds of a business, will be exempt from the act. On the other
hand, anyone engaged in a business or commercial enterprise clearly
acts "in or affecting commerce." An investigation of North Carolina
case law shows that "traditional" businesses which involve an
exchange or buyer-seller relationship, such as a department store or
manufacturing plant, satisfy the second element since the issue of
whether these businesses fall under the statute is rarely litigated.
47. Johnson, 266 S.E.2d at 620; see also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908);
Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); State ex
rel. Edmisten v. J. C. Penney Co., 233 S.E.2d 895 (N.C. 1977).
48. J. C. Penney Co., 233 S.E.2d at 899.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-1.1(b).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(c).
51. Rosenthal v. Perkins, 257 S.E.2d 63, 67 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Robertson v.
Boyd, 363 S.E.2d 672, 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
52. Rosenthal, 257 S.E.2d at 67; accord Bhatti v. Buckland, 400 S.E.2d 440, 443
(N.C. 1991); Robertson, 363 S.E.2d at 676.
[Vol. 29:333340
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol29/iss2/8
2007] COMBATING BUSINESSES WHO UNDERCUT COMPETITION 341
When a dispute arises regarding the business enterprise portion
of the analysis, cases generally fall into two categories: real estate and
lender-debtor. Businesses within ambit of section 75-1.1 include com-
mercial property rentals,5 3 home buying, selling, or leasing as a busi-
ness, 4 borrower and mortgage broker relationships, 55 and buyer-seller
relationships.56 In all of the aforementioned areas, if the person was in
the business of renting or lending, a business enterprise was found
satisfying the requirements under section 75-1.1. Cases finding the
alleged violators were not engaged in business enterprises included
private parties in the sale of real estate5 7 and matters of internal corpo-
rate management.5 8 It is also worthy to mention, especially to those
reading this comment, the professional services, i.e. the "member of a
learned profession" exception, applies to attorneys, even those practic-
ing in debt collection, thus shielding them from the provisions of
unfair trade acts.9
D. Proximately Caused Actual Injury to the Plaintiff or to His
Business
The final element for a cause of action under section 75-1.1 is that
the act or practice must proximately cause actual injury to the plaintiff
or to his business. 60 The statute requires plaintiffs to suffer "actual
injury" but does not define the term. 61 A review of North Carolina
case law shows that the actual injury element is not heavily litigated.
As shown by the two cases discussed below, actual injury requires a
showing of actual loss or damage.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals noted in Bailey v. LeBeau
that as an essential element of a cause of action under section 75-1.1, a
53. Kent v. Humphries, 275 S.E.2d 176 (N.C. Ct. App.), affid and modified, 281
S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 1981).
54. Adams v. Moore, 385 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
55. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 266 S.E.2d 610 (N.C. 1980).
56. Buie v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 289 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); American
Marble Corp. v. Crawford, 351 S.E.2d 848 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987); Liggett Group, Inc. v.
Sunas, 437 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
57. Robertson, 363 S.E.2d 672; Johnson v. Beverly-Hanks & Assocs., 388 S.E.2d
584 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 400 S.E.2d 38 (N.C. 1991).
58. Wilson v. Blue Ridge Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 578 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding matters of internal corporate management, such as the manner of selection of
and qualifications for directors, do not affect commerce in the context of a claim of
unfair and deceptive trade practices).
59. Godfredson v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 387 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D.N.C. 2005); see
also Sharp v. Gailor, 510 S.E.2d 702 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
60. Furr v. Fonville Morisey Realty, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
61. See Canady v. Mann, 419 S.E.2d 597, 602 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
9
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plaintiff must prove a defendant violated the section but also the plain-
tiff has suffered actual injury as a proximate result of defendants act or
practice. 62 The act committed in Bailey was a misrepresentation con-
cerning engine parts purchased and used in the plaintiffs automo-
bile.63 The court in Bailey stated the plaintiff failed to show evidence
of an actual injury and emphasized this fact by noting the automobile
failed to breakdown due to the engine parts.
64
The North Carolina Court of Appeals also addressed actual injury
in Canady v. Mann.6" Canady involved a plaintiff land purchaser who
sued a defendant land development corporation due to the sale of real
estate lots that were allegedly uninhabitable. 66 The court stated suffi-
cient evidence was present for actual injury due to the loss of use of
the purchase money and closing costs, loss of potential interest the
funds used for the purchase price and the closing costs could have
earned, and loss of the appreciated value of property, i.e., loss of the
benefit of the bargain.67
IV. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR COMBATING BUSINESSES THAT HIRE
ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS TO OBTAIN A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
The inquiry now is to determine a framework based upon the gen-
eral guidelines set out in section III and establish whether the fact pat-
tern in Global Horizons, Inc. can be successfully litigated in North
Carolina under section 75-1.1.
A summary of a hypothetical fact pattern identical to Global Hori-
zons Inc. is as follows:
Plaintiff, a duly licensed North Carolina business, provides farm
labor contracting services to commercial farmers. Plaintiff competes
with another firm, Defendant Supplier, who also provides labor con-
tracting services to commercial farmers. Defendant Farmer, a com-
mercial farmer and also a duly licensed business in North Carolina,
owns a farm and sells and markets fruits and vegetables grown on his
farm to the food industry.
Defendant Farmer engages in intrastate commerce by selling, dis-
tributing, and marketing commercially grown agricultural products.
Plaintiff and Defendant Supplier engage in intrastate commerce by
62. Bailey v. LeBeau, 339 S.E.2d 460 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), modified and affd, 348
S.E.2d 524 (N.C. 1986).
63. Id. at 464.
64. Id.
65. Canady, 419 S.E.2d 597.
66. Id. at 599.
67. Id. at 603.
[Vol. 29:333342
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supplying labor to Defendant Farmer and other businesses requiring
such labor.
Defendant Farmer and Plaintiff enter into a contract for Plaintiff to
supply labor to Defendant Farmer to pick blueberries. The contract
stipulates that hired employees will pick 10 pounds of blueberries per
hour.
In the middle of the growing season, Defendant Farmer contacts
Plaintiff and alleges hired employees provided by Plaintiff failed to
meet picking requirements. Consequently, Plaintiff Farmer states it
will terminate the contract due to Plaintiffs material breach of
agreement.
Defendant Farmer then contracts with Defendant Supplier to sup-
ply labor for Defendant Farmer's commercial farm. Defendant Sup-
plier hires illegal immigrants and thus, due to lower labor costs, offers
a better deal to Defendant Farmer. All of Plaintiffs labor pool consists
of legal U.S. citizens or migrant farm laborers under an H2-A program,
which in turn requires additional costs to hire, unlike the laborers of
Defendant Supplier.
What cause of action does Plaintiff have against the Defendants
under section 75-1.1? The statute states "Unfair methods of competi-
tion in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful."6
A. Defendant Farmer and Supplier "In or Affecting Commerce"
The analysis can begin with the establishment of the "in or affect-
ing commerce" portion of section 75-1.1. Under the Rosenthal reason-
ing, which involved buying and selling real estate, "It is clear from the
cases involving violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act that the
alleged violators must be engaged in a business, a commercial or
industrial establishment or enterprise. "69 Defendant Farmer clearly is
operating a business enterprise, is involved in the selling of agricul-
tural products, and falls under the buyer-seller relationship. 7°
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2005).
69. Bhatti v. Buckland, 440 S.E.2d 440, 443 (N.C. 1991) (quoting Rosenthal v.
Perkins, 257 S.E.2d 63, 67 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)); see also Robertson v. Boyd, 363
S.E.2d 672, 676 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) ("[P]rivate parties engaged in the sale of a
residence [are] not involved in trade or commerce and cannot be held liable under
[Chapter 75].").
70. See Buie v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 289 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); American
Marble Corp. v. Crawford, 351 S.E.2d 848 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987); Liggett Group, Inc. v.
Sunas, 437 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
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Defendant Supplier is also in a business enterprise that provides
the supply of laborers. A unique case that is directly on point is Win-
ston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc.71 The facts in Winston Reality Co.
involved a private personnel service that advertised qualified person-
nel.7 2 The plaintiff brought an unfair trade practices claim against the
personnel agency, alleging that the agency falsely advertised that it
screened its applicants.73 The defendant in Winston Reality Co. argued
that Chapter 75 applies only to buyer-seller relationships and competi-
tion between business competitors. 4 The court, ruling against defen-
dant's argument, stated:
The breadth and scope of these provisions requires no elaboration, and
we are of the opinion that defendant's activities were covered by them.
In recommending employees to plaintiff and other employers defen-
dant certainly was engaged in business and its activities obviously
affected commerce. On this subject, our Supreme Court has said,
"'commerce' in its broadest sense comprehends intercourse for the
purposes of trade in any form." No doubt, because the Act is so broad
and comprehensive, the Legislature specifically excluded members of a
learned profession from its application, but it has not excluded
employment agencies, and defendant has not shown that it is exempt.
We therefore hold that [clhapter 75 does apply to defendant's activities
75in this case ....
Winston Reality Co. thus establishes that Defendant Supplier, a
business providing employment services, is a business that is subject
to the in or affecting commerce provisions of section 75-1.1.
B. The Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices of Defendant Farmer
and Supplier
The second issue is whether the conduct of Defendant Farmer and
Defendant Supplier constitutes an unfair or deceptive act. Under the
aforementioned requirements for unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
Plaintiff will have to establish that Defendants Farmer and Supplier
engaged in conduct which amounts to an inequitable assertion of its
power or position, in a practice that is unethical or unscrupulous, or
71. 320 S.E.2d 286 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), affd, 331 S.E.2d 677 (N.C. 1985).
72. Winston Realty, 320 S.E.2d at 289.
73. Id. at 289
74. Id. at 290.
75. Id. at 291 (internal citations omitted).
76. Johnson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co, 266 S.E.2d 610, 622 (N.C. 1980).
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in an act or practice that has a tendency to deceive.77 Furthermore,
Plaintiff can also classify Defendant's acts as unfair or deceptive by
establishing a violation of public policy.78
The public policy route may be the easiest to satisfy if Plaintiff can
prove that Defendant Farmer or Supplier violated a North Carolina
statute. The two most prevalent areas to consider in the context of
hiring illegal immigrants is that employers either pay illegal immi-
grants below the statutory minimum wage requirement and or pay ille-
gal immigrants "under the table," evading North Carolina taxes. A
violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act and violation of
Chapter 105 entitled "Taxation" are violations of North Carolina pub-
lic policy.
Wages in North Carolina are governed by the North Carolina Gen-
eral Statutes, which state:
The public policy of this state is declared as follows: The wage levels of
employees, hours of labor, payment of earned wages, and the well-
being of minors are subjects of concern requiring legislation to pro-
mote the general welfare of the people of the State without jeopardizing
the competitive position of North Carolina business and industry.79
In Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., the plaintiffs filed a suit against
their employer for paying wages that were substantially below the cur-
rent minimum wage.80 The court in Amos recognized that the mini-
mum wage is the public policy of North Carolina.8 Consequently, the
court held that firing an employee for refusing to work for less than the
statutory minimum wage violates the public policy of North
Carolina.8 2
Taxes in North Carolina are governed by Chapter 105 of the North
Carolina General Statutes.83 Occurrences and penalties that arise
from tax evasion are specifically addressed.8 4 For example, it is a vio-
lation of the statute if a person "willfully fails to collect or truthfully
account for and pay [taxes] .... Consequently, an employer who
77. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing
Marshall v. Miller, 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (N.C. 1981) and Overstreet v. Brookland, Inc.,
279 S.E.2d 1, 7 (N.C. 1981)).
78. Process Components, Inc. v. Baltimore Aircoil Co., 366 S.E.2d 907 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1988), affd, 374 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. 1988).
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.1(b) (2005).
80. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 167-68 (N.C. 1992).
81. Id. at 169-70.
82. Id. at 170.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 105-1 to -564 (2005).
84. § 105-236(a).
85. § 105-236(a)(8).
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knowingly hires any employee, legally or illegally, and fails to account
for payroll taxes is in violation of the law and consequently in viola-
tion of North Carolina's public policy, thus satisfying the "untruthful
or deceptive" requirements of section 75.
An unresolved issue that has not been addressed by North Caro-
lina courts is whether a violation of a federal statute would also be a
violation of North Carolina public policy. The North Carolina
Supreme Court, by adopting the language of a Seventh Circuit deci-
sion, added to the public policy approach regarding the violation of
general statutes by holding in Johnson v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
Co. 6 a trade practice is generally unfair when the practice is "immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious. ' 7
North Carolina courts have not addressed whether hiring illegal immi-
grants to obtain an unfair competitive advantage is "immoral, unethi-
cal, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious."
Reviewing Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission shows that vio-
lation of federal public policy triggers a violation of the FTCA,88 which
is similar to Chapter 75 of the North Carolina General Statutes.8 9 In
Spiegel, Inc., the court cited National Candy Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, which held:
[A] method of competition which is contrary to the established public
policy of the United States is an unfair method of competition within
the intent and meaning of section 5 of the statute. A violation of public
policy is an injury to the public, and it is in the public interest to pre-
vent the use of a method of competition which is contrary to an estab-
lished public policy of the Federal Government, even if injury to
competitors be not alleged or proved.90
It is recognized in antitrust cases in North Carolina that proof of
conduct that violates federal antitrust statutes is generally sufficient
proof to establish a violation of the North Carolina Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act.9 ' Furthermore, the North Carolina Supreme Court recog-
nized in Johnson that, because of the similarity in language of North
Carolina section 75-1.1 and the Federal Trade Commission Act, it is
appropriate for North Carolina courts to look to the federal decisions
86. 266 S.E.2d at 621; see generally Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir.
1976).
87. Ken-Mar Finance v. Harvey, 368 S.E.2d 646, 648 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
88. 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a).
90. National Candy Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 104 F.2d 999, 1006 (7th Cir.
1939).
91. ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1983).
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interpreting the FTC Act for guidance in construing the meaning of
this section.92 A logical line of reasoning is that hiring illegal immi-
grants is a violation of federal statutes and thus a violation of federal
public policy. Since North Carolina has no official public policy con-
flicting with the federal policy, the federal public policy is therefore the
policy of North Carolina. Another line of reasoning is that since hiring
illegal immigrants is a violation of federal laws, it is also unethical or
unscrupulous, especially if it is done to undercut a competitor.
Additionally, Defendant Farmer will be "guilty of an unfair act or
practice when it engages in conduct which amounts to an inequitable
assertion of its power or position. '93 This issue was addressed by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Owens v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of
Hickory.94 In Owens, the plaintiff brought an action against the defen-
dant for alleged unfair practices and price-fixing under sections 75-1.1
and 75-5 and for tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage. 95 Plaintiff claimed defendant had unlawfully imposed
restrictions on the amount of twelve-packs and two-liter bottles of soft
drinks plaintiff could purchase, sell, and wholesale and had unlaw-
fully attempted to force him to raise his prices for two-liters.
96
The plaintiffs claim of unfair practices in Owens, brought under
section 75-1.1, alleged that defendant employed coercive business tac-
tics to force him to raise his retail prices for two-liters. 97 The plaintiffs
evidence in Owens showed "that on at least two occasions defendant
demanded that he raise his retail price for two-liters and threatened to
cut off his supply if he did not comply." 8 The court stated that the
forecast of evidence offered by plaintiff was sufficient to raise a ques-
tion of fact as to whether defendant imposed the two-liter supply
restrictions in order restrict sales. 99
This form of coercion in Owens is typical in situations involving
one party exerting an "inequitable assertion of its power or position"
and applicable to the conduct of Defendant Farmer. If Defendant
Farmer used his position, in a similar fashion to the defendant in
Owens, to restrict the business activities of Plaintiff, Defendant Farmer
committed an unfair act or practice in violation of section 75-1.1. For
92. Johnson, 266 S.E.2d at 620 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)); Ken-Mar Fin. v.
Harvey, 368 S.E.2d 646 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
93. Johnson, 266 S.E.2d at 622.
94. Owens v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 412 S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 1992).
95. Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 75-1.1(a), 75-5(b)(3)).
96. Id. at 637.
97. Id. at 639.
98. Id. at 642.
99. Id. at 643.
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example, under the Owens reasoning, if Defendant Farmer demanded
cheaper employment and threatened to cut-off business relations for
failing to do so, this would raise an issue of fact as to whether Defen-
dant Farmer imposed the demands in order to prevent restrictions on
the supply of labor.
V. BUSINEss TORTS APPLIED UNDER SECTION 75-1.1
In addition to unfair and deceptive acts or practices, North Caro-
lina recognizes that business torts can be brought as actions under
section 75-1.1. Two actions that have been used in North Carolina are
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and tortu-
ous interference with a contract.
A. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
An action for tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage is recognized in North Carolina. 100 An action for tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage is based on conduct
by a party which prevents another party from entering into a contract
with a third party.1 ' In Coleman v. Whisnant, the North Carolina
Supreme Court stated the following:
We think the general rule prevails that unlawful interference with the
freedom of contract is actionable, whether it consists in maliciously
procuring breach of a contract, or in preventing the making of a con-
tract when this is done, not in the legitimate exercise of the defen-
dant[s'] own rights, but with design to injure the plaintiffs, or gaining
some advantage at [their] expense .... Maliciously inducing a person
not to enter into a contract with another, which he would otherwise
have entered into, is actionable if damage results." The word "mali-
cious" used in referring to malicious interference with formation of a
contract does not import ill will, but refers to an interference with
design of injury to plaintiffs or gaining some advantage at [their]
expense. 10
2
Thus, to state a claim for wrongful interference with prospective
advantage, a party must allege facts to show that the accused acted
without justification in "inducing a third party to refrain from entering
100. Walker v. Sloan, 529 S.E.2d 236 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
101. Owens, 412 S.E.2d at 644.
102. 35 S.E.2d 647, 656 (N.C. 1945) (quoting Kamm v. Flink, 175 A. 62, 67 (NJ.
1943)) (internal citations omitted).
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into a contract with them which contract would have ensued but for
the interference.'
1 0 3
A leading case in North Carolina for tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage is Owens v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. 1o4
In Owens, the tort claim arose from the plaintiffs final claim that the
defendant interfered with the business relationship between the plain-
tiff and his institutional customers thereby robbing him of prospective
economic advantage. '0 5 The plaintiff's evidence showed the defendant
curtailed his supply of twelve-packs so he could no longer fill orders
from local schools and factories and then forbade at least one of those
customers from continuing to purchase from the plaintiff.' °6 The
court held tortious interference with prospective economic advantage
may be based on conduct which prevents the making of contracts.'0 7
The court stated further,
[T]he general rule prevails that unlawful interference with the freedom
of contract is actionable, whether it consists in maliciously procuring
breach of a contract, or in preventing the making of a contract when
this is done, not in the legitimate exercise of defendant's own right, but
with design to injure the plaintiff, or gaining some advantage at his
expense.' 
08
Application to Defendant Farmer and Supplier demonstrates
Plaintiff can bring a valid claim under tortious interference with eco-
nomic interference if he can establish the Defendants hired illegal
immigrants to injure Plaintiff and gained an advantage by hiring illegal
immigrants at a lower cost from Defendant Supplier, thereby giving
them an advantage at Plaintiffs expense.
B. Wrongful Interference with Contractual Rights
The final remedy available to Plaintiff against Defendant Farmer
and Supplier is the tort of wrongful interference with contractual
rights. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated the essential ele-
ments of wrongful interference with contractual rights as follows:
... First, that a valid contract existed between the plaintiff and a third
person, conferring upon the plaintiff some contractual right against
the third person. Second, that the outsider had knowledge of the plain-
103. Cameron v. New Hanover Mem'l Hosp., 293 S.E.2d 901, 917 (N.C. Ct. App.
1982).
104. 412 S.E.2d 636.
105. Id. at 639.
106. Id. at 645.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 644.
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tiffs contract with the third person. Third, that the outsider intention-
ally induced the third person not to perform his contract with the
plaintiff. Fourth, that in so doing the outsider acted without justifica-
tion. Fifth, that the outsider's act caused the plaintiff actual
damages.1 0 9
One must be aware a tort claim of this nature can be raised inde-
pendently from section 75-1.1, but the North Carolina Supreme Court
held in United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall that tortious interference with
contract situations are also governed by section 75-1.1, as they are not
"limited to actions involving consumers, or, when used to protect busi-
ness, . . . to areas involving fraudulent advertising or a buyer-seller
relationship." 10
The transformation from a standard tort claim for tortious inter-
ference with contract situations to a claim that can be brought under
section 75-1.1 occurs when there are "aggravating circumstances."'1 1
The court in Baldine v. Furniture Comfort Corp. stated, "Although a
mere breach of contract does not constitute a violation of this section,
a breach accompanied with aggravating circumstances, such as an
intentional misrepresentation made for the purpose of deceiving
another and which has the natural tendency to injure another, can vio-
late the statute."'1
12
Applying the fact patterns for the illegal immigrant scheme, if
Defendant Farmer made intentional misrepresentations regarding the
amount of blueberries picked for the purpose of deceiving Plaintiff,
which in turn injured Plaintiff because the contract was terminated,
the conduct would fall within the sphere of analysis offered under
Baldine. These factors buttress the claim as one possessing aggravating
circumstances, thus transforming the claim from one under the com-
mon law to one to one falling under section 75-1.1.
C. Benefits of Raising a Tort Claim under Section 75-1.1
Both of the aforementioned torts can be raised outside the penum-
bra of section 75-1.1, but it would be prudent for Plaintiff to ensure
these claims are also raised under section 75-1.1. The benefits offered
to Plaintiff under the section provide the essential reason for trans-
forming a claim. Unlike a traditional tort, a winning plaintiff in a sec-
109. Childress v. Abeles, 84 S.E.2d 176, 181-82 (N.C. 1954) (internal citations
omitted).
110. United Lab. v. Kuykendall, 370 S.E.2d 375, 383 (N.C. 1988).
111. Baldine v. Furniture Comfort Corp., 956 F. Supp. 580, 587 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
112. Id.
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tion 75-1.1 case automatically receives treble damages. 1 13
Furthermore, the plaintiff's "duly licensed attorney" may get attorney's
fees at the discretion of the court.
114
VI. CONCLUSION
The "unfair or deceptive" act or practice prong of section 75-1.1
may offer hope for North Carolina businesses harmed by companies
that disregard federal laws and North Carolina public policy by hiring
illegal immigrants. Furthermore, tortious interference with prospec-
tive economic advantage and contractual rights may also offer strategic
litigation opportunities for businesses being destroyed by firms that
undercut the competition by hiring illegal immigrations.
In closing, the causes of action previously discussed are not the
only approaches an innovative attorney can use to hold businesses
accountable for hiring illegal immigrants. Due to the expansive nature
of section 75-1.1, alternative approaches may be developed under the
first prong of "unfair methods." Additionally, North Carolina antitrust
laws encompass standard antitrust causes of action and may offer
additional courses of action for businesses and consumers harmed by
businesses that exploit illegal immigrants to obtain a competitive
advantage.' 1 5
Boris S. Abbey
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2005); see also Pinehurst, Inc. v. O'Leary Bros. Realty,
338 S.E.2d 918 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Peterson v. Bozzano, 183 B.R. 735 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 1995).
114. § 75-16.1.
115. §§ 75-1 (Sherman § 1 analog); 75-2 (common law adopted); 75-4 (regulating
non-competition agreements); 75-16 (private right of action for treble damages).
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